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Abstract
This paper investigates the search and consumption behavior of workers as they move
between readily available low wage employment and uncertain search for a high wage
job. Analytic results derived from our model include: (1) voluntary planned quits occur
in a cyclical pattern, (2) consumption while searching falls over time until either a good
job is found or assets run out and the worker accepts a low wage job, (3) consumption
during low wage employment is less than earnings, and (4) the durations of job search
and employment as well as the pattern of consumption are related to turnover costs and
wages. Empirical evidence from the 1995 Canadian out of Employment Panel (COEP)
broadly supports these relationships. In these data, there exists a high incidence of
displaced workers taking temporary low wage jobs. Examining the income, consumption
and savings patterns of workers in di¤erent regimes, we …nd that these accord with the
theoretical predictions.
JEL Classi…cations: D83, D91, J64
Keywords: Unemployment, Search, Consumption, Assets
1 Introduction
A growing literature documents the propensity of workers who lose jobs to move to
temporary employment, to have subsequent separations, and to move into part-time or
otherwise unsatisfactory employment. For example, Farber (1999) shows that displaced
workers commonly take up temporary jobs and “involuntary” part-time jobs, and Boheim
and Taylor (2002) show that jobs that follow an unemployment spell have shorter average
durations than other jobs. Farber further shows that the probability of temporary or part-
time work falls with time since displacement, suggesting that these arrangements are part
of a transitional process back to desirable employment.
Similar patterns emerge from a recent Canadian survey of job losers. Table 1 docu-
ments outcomes of displaced workers sampled in the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment
Panel (COEP). (Details about the data are provided below.) The sample is limited to
workers who lost a “good” job - one in which they had been employed full time for over a
year without absence, and further, to workers who had no expectation of recall. Table 1
illustrates that six to ten months after the loss of a good job, 33.3% of such workers are
still in the spell of unemployment that began with that job loss, while 37.6% are in the
…rst spell of employment subsequent to that job loss. The remaining 29.1% of workers
are either in a subsequent unemployment spell or a subsequent employment spell and
thus have had some temporary employment. Of course, some of those in their …rst spell
of employment may also be in a temporary job.
The data allow us to look at this in two ways. First, of those in the …rst spell of
employment subsequent to a job loss, 29.3% do not expect to be in that job for a full
year. Second, a substantially overlapping 24.9% consider this job to be not as good as the
job they lost. Thus, in total, more than a third of workers who lose a permanent (long
tenure) job take some temporary work in the …rst three quarters after displacement. This
is work that they either quickly leave or do not expect to remain in.
While evidence of substantial temporary employment after job loss has mounted, the
reasons for this phenomenon are not well understood. One possibility is that credit
constrained job losers use short term, “bad” jobs to …nance further search, an idea not
readily incorporated into the standard search models that inform much thinking about
unemployment. In particular, employment in such models is permanent (unless there is
a subsequent shock). Job seekers are assumed to have risk neutral preferences and hence
maximize the expected utility of the present discounted value of income less costs. This
speci…cation implies that the pattern of consumption is either indeterminate or completely
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insured. It also generates a stationary reservation wage strategy. A wage o¤er rejected
today will not be acceptable in the future and any accepted job opportunity will always
be preferred to further search. (See Mortensen, 1986). As a result, the transition rate
from unemployment into employment does not vary with the duration of search or with
di¤erences in wealth. In addition, workers only leave a job if they …nd a better opportunity
(through on-the-job search) or if the employment relationship changes in some way so
that the payo¤ to continued work becomes less productive than the return to search.
For risk averse job seekers without insurance, this characterization does not apply.
In this case, the optimal pattern of consumption becomes well de…ned. Individuals with
higher assets consume more. In addition, the job acceptance decision also depends on the
individual’s asset levels although further restrictions on the degree of risk aversion are
needed to characterize this relationship. Job seekers with decreasing absolute risk aversion
become pickier as assets increase (the reservation wage declines with asset holdings). As
a result, rich individuals search longer and hence tend to match with higher paying
jobs (Danforth, 1979). In addition, as risk averse job seekers consume from assets and
become less picky, they may on occasion want to recall previously rejected o¤ers (Hall,
Lippman and McCall, 1979). Employment, however, is again permanent - as with risk
neutral job search - so that unless something changes for the worker, there are no job-to-
unemployment transitions.
This paper develops a model in which credit constraints can give rise to employment-
to-unemployment turnover. Lacking the ability to borrow or insure, risk averse individuals
become willing to accept readily available, low wage “bad” jobs in order to accumulate
assets which subsequently fund search for high wage “good” jobs. If the ensuing search for
high wage employment proves unsuccessful and assets become depleted, these individuals
then take up bad jobs again and repeat the cycle. Bad jobs act as a ‡oor or safety net
for those who are unsuccessful at job search and do not have the ability to borrow. As a
result, temporary employment in bad jobs generates quits without shocks to productivity
or in the job search process. The pattern of asset accumulation and consumption follows
accordingly. For the model developed below, workers in a bad job save a constant fraction
of their wage. At some point they have accumulated su¢cient assets to quit the bad job
and start search for a good job. During this search period, assets decline over time until
either a good job is found or the worker exhausts all assets and returns to another low
paying job.
Job seekers would prefer borrowing against future income to fund consumption during
search rather than using low wage work to build assets. Credit constraints prevent such
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behavior and hence take on a central role in the determination of income distribution.
Rather than limit human capital investment as often discussed in the literature, here they
restrict the extent of search and thereby the ‡ow of workers into desirable high wage jobs.
The next section develops the model. Section 3 subsequently presents an analysis of
the e¤ects of changes in turnover costs and wages. This analysis reveals that turnover
costs play a key role in determining asset accumulation as well as the durations of em-
ployment and job search. In particular, rising turnover costs lead to a longer employment
spells in low wage jobs. While in these bad jobs, individuals save a higher level of assets
but at a slower rate. When they do search, workers are more cautious. They run down
assets at a slower rate by consuming less and thereby searching longer.
Section 4 returns to the COEP data to investigate a particular implication of the
model. The model predicts that workers in temporary jobs should have high savings
rates and low average propensities to consume when compared to those back in a “good”
job. This seems counter-intuitive: ”permanent income” models suggest that those with
temporarily low incomes should have high average propensities to consume. However,
this predition of our model is exactly what an analysis of the Canadian data reveals. The
expenditures (measured as a fraction of pre-displacement expenditure levels) of workers
in temporary, unsatisfactory employment is markedly di¤erent from those of workers who
report being back in “good” jobs. The distribution of proportional expenditure changes
among workers in temporary, unsatisfactory employment is actually quite similar to the
distribution of unemployed (searching) individuals. However, temporary workers have
higher incomes than searchers and thus, consistent with the model, they have higher
savings rates. Parametric and nonparametric tests con…rm the statistical signi…cance of
these di¤erences. Section 5 concludes and o¤ers some directions for future research.
2 The Model
Suppose workers can at any time accept a low paying job at a wage wL > 0: Such jobs are
always available. Individuals who forgo the low wage sector (and only these workers) can
search for higher paying employment with the associated wage wH > wL: When looking
for a job, a job seeker receives a high wage o¤er with probability ®: The key feature here
is that low wage jobs are easier to …nd than high wage jobs. The ‡ow payments during
unemployed search from sources such as unemployment insurance are normalized to zero.
While employed and during the job search process, a worker chooses consumption to
maximize expected lifetime utility. Let u(¢) represent the worker’s risk averse preferences
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in each period. u(¢) is continuous, di¤erentiable and bounded above with the standard
Inada properties so that u0(¢) > 0; u00(¢) < 0; u(0) = 0; u0(0) = 1; and u0(1) = 0
Time is continuous and in…nite. Suppose that at time t a worker has assets At ¸ 0:
A worker entering the market for the …rst time does so with assets A0 ¸ 0: Job seekers
earn interest on these assets at rate r which also equals the individual’s rate of time
preference. Although accepting a low wage job is costless, it is not costless to embark on
search. Entrants into the market who decide to search immediately as well as low wage
workers who quit employment in order to search pay a turnover cost K > 0:
Turnover costs have a number of compatible interpretations. For transitions from low
wage employment, the most immediate corresponds to an upfront search cost as well as an
exit cost borne by the worker. In the context presented here, a search or exit cost of this
sort is equivalent to an entry fee in the low wage sector properly adjusted in present value
terms.1 An alternative view is that these costs represent (round trip) transportation costs
between spatially distinct sectors, the low wage - full employment and the high wage with
search unemployment sectors. This perspective highlights the similarities of this model
with that of Harris and Todaro (1970). Here, however, the economy explicitly accounts
for the dynamic ‡ows between sectors. Of course, the act of changing sectors need not
be explicitly spatial but nonetheless involve a transportation cost.
Consider …rst the “partial” problem of a job seeker (an individual in the job search
process) with assets AD which are at this point given. AD ¸ 0 may di¤er from initial
assets A0 if the worker initially participates in the low wage sector. While looking for high
wage employment, the worker’s problem is to choose the maximum duration of search
T (given a job is not found), a consumption path, ct for t 2 [0; T ]; and the asset level
desired at the end of the search period, AT ¸ 0. These decisions are made bearing in
mind the opportunities of low wage employment, represented here by the value of low
wage employment, V (A):
As high paid jobs last forever, a worker with assets At in a high wage job will optimally
consume rAt + wH inde…nitely. The corresponding value of high wage employment is
therefore u(rAt + wH)=r: As a result, the searching worker’s problem can be written as2
1As discussed below, a worker with su¢ciently high assets will initially search. In this case, there is
no exit from (or entry into) the low wage sector to generate the cost K: As the focus here is on ‡ows
between job search and low wage employment, this fault in the interpretation of K is of minor concern.
2The objective function can be viewed as the limit of a related discrete time problem. Given a time
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W (AD) = max
ct;T;AT
TZ
0
u(ct)e
¡(r+®)tdt+
®
r
TZ
0
u(rAs + wH)e
¡(r+®)sds+ e¡(r+®)TV (AT )
subject to
AD ¡
TZ
0
cte
¡rtdt ¡ e¡rTAT ¸ 0 (Budget Constraint)
and
e¡rTAT ¸ 0 (Credit Constraint)
where
As = e
rs
24AD ¡ sZ
0
cve
¡rvdv
35 ¸ 0 s 2 [0; T ]
Characterizing the value of working in low wage jobs, V (A); completes the speci…ca-
tion of the worker’s decision problem. Workers in low wage employment have the option
of turning at some time to high wage job search at a cost K or remaining inde…nitely in
low wage employment with no intention of further search. A worker in low wage employ-
ment with initial assets A0 chooses a duration of employment D; a consumption pattern,
&¿ for ¿ 2 [0;D]; and a terminal level of assets AD ¸ 0: If the worker turns to high
wage job search (D < 1), terminal assets fund the turnover cost K and the subsequent
consumption while searching.
The worker’s problem is thus expressed by3:
V (A0) = max
&¿ ;D;AD
DZ
0
u(&¿ )e
¡r¿d¿ + e¡rDW (AD)
period of length dt > 0; the worker receives the expected payo¤
W (A) = u(c0)dt +
TX
t=1
µ
1 ¡ ®dt
1 + rdt
¶t
u(ct)dt+
®dt
1¡®dt
TX
t=1
µ
1 ¡ ®dt
1 + rdt
¶t
u(rAt + wH)=r
+
1
1 ¡ ®dt
µ
1 ¡ ®dt
1 + rdt
¶T
V (AT )
Letting dt ! 0 yields the continuous time objective function.
3There are also implicit nonnegativity constraints on the choice variables. As discusssed below, these
are potentially binding only for the duration of low wage employment (D ¸ 0).
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subject to
A0 +
DZ
0
(wL ¡ &¿)e¡r¿d¿ ¡ e¡rDAD ¡ e¡rDK = 0 (Budget Constraint)
and
e¡rD(AD ¡ K) ¸ 0 (Credit Constraint)
Substituting in for W (AD) as well as for AD in the budget constraint yields the
following problem
V (A0) = max
&¿ ;ct;D;T;AT
DZ
0
u(&¿)e
¡r¿d¿ + e¡rD
8<:
TZ
0
u(ct)e
¡(r+®)tdt
+
®
r
TZ
0
u(rAs + wH)e
¡(r+®)sds+ e¡(r+®)TV (AT )
9=;
subject to
A0 +
DZ
0
(wL ¡ &¿)e¡r¿d¿ ¡ e¡rD
TZ
0
cte
¡rtdt ¡ e¡rDK ¡ e¡r(D+T )AT ¸ 0
and
e¡r(D+T )AT ¸ 0
where now
As = e
rs
8<:erDA0 + erD
DZ
0
(wL ¡ &À)e¡rÀdÀ ¡
sZ
0
cve
¡rvdv ¡ K
9=; ¸ 0 s 2 [0; T ]
2.1 Consumption Behavior
Associate Lagrange multipliers ¹1 and ¹2 with the budget and credit constraints respec-
tively. The …rst order conditions for consumption while working in a low wage job (&¿)
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are4
e¡r¿
8<:u0(&¿)¡ ®
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sds ¡ ¹1
9=; = 0 ¿ 2 [0;D]
These equations imply that the individual will choose constant consumption over this pe-
riod.5 Denoting ¹& = &¿ for all ¿ 2 [0; D] and rearranging terms, the …rst order conditions
reduce to a single equation
u0(¹&)¡ ®
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sds ¡ ¹1 = 0 (1)
For consumption during high wage job search (ct), the …rst order conditions are
e¡r(D+t)
8<:u0(ct)e¡®t ¡ ®
TZ
t
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sds ¡ ¹1
9=; = 0 t 2 [0; T ] (2)
From equation (1) and equation (2) for t = 0, consumption at the beginning of search
equals consumption during low wage employment (if low wage employment is taken on)
which in turn is less than or equal to the low wage plus initial asset income: c0 = ¹& ·
rA0+wL: It can also be established from (2) that consumption during search ct is strictly
positive for all t and decreasing over time. As search proceeds, consumption falls until
either a high wage job is found or search terminates with corresponding consumption cT :
If the worker chooses to cycle back and forth between low wage employment and high
wage job search, this consumption pattern implies that a jump in consumption occurs
4The asset equation for As implies that
@As=@&¿ = ¡er(D+s¡¿) s 2 [0; T ] ¿ 2 [0;D]
@As=@ct =
8<: ¡e
r(s¡t) s ¸ t
0 s < t
0 · s; t · T
@As=@D = e
rs
24rerDA0 + rerD DZ
0
(wL ¡ &v)e¡rvdv + wL ¡ &D
35
@As=@T = @As=@AT = 0
5In the adopted notation here, the indices t; ¿ and s do not necessarily correspond to chronological
time. For consumption during low wage employment, ¿ does at …rst match real time but for consumption
while searching, ct; this index di¤ers from the date by D. Of course, if cycles of work and employment
occur, the index further di¤ers by a multiple of T + D:
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when low wage temporary employment begins anew but not when the worker quits low
wage employment.
The jump at the end of search can be intuitively understood by considering the
marginal value of using assets to …nance an added unit of consumption today. When
searching, the opportunity cost of consuming a little more today is having to give up
search sooner. Toward the end of search, this means not being able to …nance the search
tomorrow. On the other hand, when working at a low wage, the opportunity cost of
a little more consumption is getting back to future search a bit later. The discounting
of postponed search creates a wedge that generates the jump. At the other extreme of
quitting low wage employment, there is no such delay. The marginal value and therefore
the level of consumption in the two states are equal.
Consumption during search can be characterized further. Provided that search occurs,
that is T > 0; equation (2) generates the di¤erential equation
_ct =
® [u0(ct)¡ u0(rAt + wH)]
u00(ct)
(3)
while the asset equation gives a second di¤erential equation in assets and consumption
_At = rAt ¡ ct (4)
Figure 1 illustrates the associated phase diagram along with the equations for _At = 0
and _ct = 0. Since these stationary lines are parallel at a distance of wH from each other,
there are no stationary points in this system. Moreover, it is straightforward to establish
that the optimal solution lies between these two lines:
rAt < ct < rAt + wH :
As a result, for any terminal point (cT ; AT ), there is a unique path and any stable path
has decreasing assets and consumption over time.
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2.2 Search and Employment Duration
As &¿ = ¹& for all ¿ ; the …rst order condition for the duration of low wage employment (D)
e¡rD
8<:u(&D)¡ r
TZ
0
u(ct)e
¡(r+®)tdt ¡ ®
TZ
0
u(rAs + wH)e
¡(r+®)sds
¡re¡(r+®)TV (AT ) + ®
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)(@As=@D)e¡(r+®)sds
+ ¹1
24wL ¡ &D + r TZ
0
cte
¡rtdt+ rK + re¡rTAT
35 ¡ ¹2re¡rTAT
9=; = 0
simpli…es to
u(¹&)¡ rV (A0) + (rA0 + wL ¡ ¹&)®
TZ
t
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sds (5)
+¹1(rA0 + wL ¡ ¹&) = 0
The remaining …rst order conditions for duration of high wage search (T ) and asset
holdings at this time (AT ) are given by:
e¡r(D+T )
n
u(cT )e
¡®T +
®
r
u(rAT + wH)e
¡®T ¡ (r + ®)e¡®TV (AT ) (6)
¡¹1(cT ¡ rAT )¡ ¹2rATg = 0
e¡r(D+T )
©
e¡®TV 0(AT )¡ ¹1 + ¹2
ª
= 0 (7)
while the Kuhn Tucker conditions for the two constraints are
¹1
8<:A0 +
DZ
0
(wL ¡ &¿)e¡r¿d¿ ¡ e¡rD
TZ
0
cte
¡rtdt ¡ e¡rDK ¡ e¡r(D+T )AT
9=; = 0 (8)
¹2e
¡r(D+T )AT = 0 (9)
The primary interest here are consumer choices of ¹&; ct for t 2 [0; T ];D; T; and AT
in which workers move back and forth between low wage employment and job search
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until …nding a permanent high wage job. Of course, such a choice along with multipliers
(¹1; ¹2) must solve equations (1)-(9) for assets A0 = AT . However, not all solutions to
these necessary (but not su¢cient) conditions are optimal choices. More speci…cally, note
that D = 1 along with &t = ¹& = rA0 + wL is always a solution for an arbitrary level of
initial assets A0 ¸ 0. In this case, ct; T;AT are undetermined as search does not occur.
Therefore to establish existence of the type of solution of interest, we …nd conditions
which rule out this solution and other alternatives.
The following claim establishes su¢cient conditions on wages and turnover costs under
which the D = 1 solution to the …rst order conditions is suboptimal. Wages in the good
jobs must be su¢ciently high to make search attractive while the turnover costs must be
su¢ciently small so that the worker is willing to participate in high wage job search.
Claim 1 If
®
r
(u(rA0 + wH)¡ u(rA0 + wL))¡ u0(rA0 + wL)wL > 0;
then a worker will at some point switch to high wage job search (D < 1) given su¢ciently
small but strictly positive K.
Proof: See Appendix
On the other hand, there may be no transition from high wage search into low wage
employment. If search is very attractive, it may be optimal to search inde…nitely, T = 1:
In this case, the job seeker runs down assets (recall that ct > rAt) so that consumption
becomes arbitrarily small as time proceeds.6 This action is ruled out when wages in good
jobs are not “too attractive.”
Claim 2 If ®
r+®
u(wH) < u(wL), then T < 1:
Proof: See Appendix
While Claim 1 establishes conditions for not remaining permanently in low wage
employment with assets A0; it does not demonstrate that a worker with these assets will
necessarily take on and then later quit a low wage job. Given A0; a worker may forgo
low wage employment altogether and search immediately. Indeed, for some initial asset
levels, low wage employment (accompanied by asset accumulation) is undesirable. Upon
6Letting the u(0) normalization (currently equal to zero) decrease will lower the attractiveness of
search when assets are low thereby easing the conditions under which cycles exist.
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entering the market, it may be optimal to set D = 0.7 Of course, following a period of
high wage job search, setting D = 0 is wasteful. A worker who discontinues high wage
search to move into low wage employment with assets AT will not then set D = 0 when
solving V (AT ): Acting in this way involves paying an avoidable turnover cost K.8
To assess what happens after pursuing of a good job, suppose a worker concludes
search with assets AT : In general, given AT it may be optimal to set D =1: If, however,
the condition in Claim 1 holds at AT ; then the worker will take on low wage employment
for a only …nite, strictly positive duration after which the worker will search yet again.
This pattern suggests that temporary low wage employment cycles could emerge if the
condition in Claim 1 holds over a range of assets. Claim 3 goes even further. It shows
that if the condition holds more generally, then at the end of unsuccessful search, an
individual will have exhausted the assets in which case the credit constraint binds.
Claim 3 If
®
r
(u(rA+ wH)¡ u(rA+ wL))¡ u0(rA+ wL)wL > 0 8 A 2 [0; A0]
then AT = 0
Proof: See Appendix
When the conditions in Claims 2 and 3 simultaneously hold, the (repeated) pattern
of low wage employment followed by high wage job search emerges. Moreover, since
these two conditions are not exclusive (examples are easy to …nd), cycles can emerge.
Regardless of initial assets, workers will (with some probability) search until assets are
used up. At this point, Claim 1 establishes that they will not take a low wage job
permanently. Claim 2 establishes they will not search with zero assets. Instead they will
take on low wage employment for a …nite period after which they search. If unsuccessful,
this search will terminate with zero assets at which point the process begins anew.9 In
other words, the solution to V (0) is such that workers cycle inde…nitely between low wage
7For assets less than K this is not feasible since the subsequent search does not occur: T = 0: For A0
greater than some critical value this will indeed be a solution. More speci…cally, if workers begin with
di¤erent endowments, A0; those with high levels of initial assets will immediately search for high wages
and only take up low wage jobs when high wage search is unsuccessful. On the other hand, workers with
low endowments will accumulate assets before search (D > 0).
8Likewise T = 0 is not part of an optimal plan as this strategy also involves paying a transition fee
without any possible payo¤ from search.
9For completeness, erratic patterns in which the choices of D and T vary can also be dismissed.
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employment and high wage job search until they ultimately …nd a high wage job, thereby
establishing the central result of this section
This cyclical pattern of employment can be illustrated from the value functions. As
depicted in Figure 2, the value of high wage search, W (A); is strictly increasing and
concave in assets A whereas the value of low wage employment, V (A); is everywhere
increasing but linear over the range of assets involving savings. (Derivations are shown
in the proof of Claim 3 in the Appendix.) In Figure 2, starting from assets A = 0; a
cycle begins with the accumulation to AD assets and the corresponding progression up
along V (A): Upon reaching AD, the individual becomes indi¤erent between low wage
employment and moving to search: V (AD) = W (AD ¡ K): Here, a smooth pasting-type
condition holds in which the value functions have the same slope, V 0(AD) = W 0(AD ¡K).
As search proceeds assets decline from this point. The individual moves down along
W (A) until assets are exhausted at which point the individual switches: V (0) = W (0):
With a binding credit constraint, the marginal return to an additional asset is strictly
greater under search than in low wage employment but the …xed cost K deters the
individual from working a very short period. Instead the process repeats itself until a
high wage job is ultimately found.
When the credit constraint does not bind (AT > 0), the solution is less involved. After
any period job search, the worker abandons the high wage market preferring (permanent)
low wage employment. This switch occurs at a point of indi¤erence which smoothly links
W (A) and V (A) through a tangency condition. Speci…cally, if D = 1 after an initial
period of search, W (AT ) = V (AT ) and W 0(AT ) = V 0(AT ).
3 Theoretical Analysis
3.1 Turnover Costs
How does consumption and the duration of job search respond to a change in turnover
costs? Do they begin search with higher assets? What are the consequences for unem-
ployment? Since asset accumulation and job quits occur only in the case where workers
who terminate job search do so when the credit constraint binds (AT = 0); when consid-
ering these e¤ects it is su¢cient to concentrate on the case in which initial and terminal
assets are zero.
As shown in the Appendix, in this cycle consumption during low wage employment
increases with turnover costs implying that the initial level of consumption during search
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also rises:
@c0=@K = @¹&=@K > 0:
On the other hand, consumption at the end of high wage job search declines with turnover
costs: @cT=@K < 0:
These results, in turn, determine the changes in employment and search durations.
Since the job search phase diagram for ct and At is independent of turnover costs, an
increased initial consumption c0 along with decreased terminal consumption cT implies
that the new solution is on lower path but with larger …rst period consumption. Given
higher initial consumption, it follows that assets rise at the outset of high wage search:
@Ad=@K > 0.
On the lower trajectory, consumption for a given asset level falls:
@c(At)=@K < 0:
With more assets being consumed at a slower rate, the duration of search necessarily
rises10: @T=@K > 0: As consumption during low wage employment rises, the rate of asset
accumulation declines. However, at the termination of the low wage job at time D; the
worker starts high wage job search with higher consumption - recall that c0 has increased.
From the phase diagram, the worker must arrive with higher assets, AD: To accumulate a
larger asset level with a slower accumulation rate requires that the duration of low wage
employment increases: @D=@K > 0:
Increased turnover costs diminishes a worker’s willingness to engage in search.11 As
search becomes more distant, low wage workers who are accumulating assets in order to
eventually seek high wage employment become less willing to sacri…ce today for more
remote rewards. Low wage workers stay longer and consume more in low wage jobs.
When they do switch to job search, they arrive prepared to search longer to o¤set the
possibility of future turnover costs. They do so by arriving with higher assets and by
consuming less given asset levels.
10Consumption as a function of the length or duration of search is in general ambiguous: @ct=@K T 0.
For low levels of t this derivative is clearly positive as @ct=0=@K > 0 but depending on risk aversion, the
decline in consumption may be more rapid under higher turnover costs so that this derivative becomes
negative.
11If turnover costs are zero, workers would work at bad jobs and then search for in…nesimally short
periods. For K = 0; a “chattering” solution between employment and search results.
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3.2 Wages
The individual’s response to wages is less transparent, with results primarily available
for initial and terminal consumption. It is straightforward to establish that a pay rise in
bad jobs increases consumption during low wage employment. Likewise, consumption at
the end of high wage job search rises with low wages:
@c0=@wL = @¹&=@wL > 0; @cT=@wL > 0
(See the Appendix for details.) As low wage pay wL does not a¤ect the phase diagram,
the new consumption path is a higher trajectory accompanied by a higher initial value.
Consumption given assets rises @c(At)=@wL > 0; however, although c0 has risen it is not
possible to graphically determine whether assets at t = 0 are higher. Given a small rise
in initial consumption on the new path, the duration of search will fall. For a su¢ciently
large rise we get the opposite e¤ect. Given this ambiguity, it is not possible to tell (at
this point) the e¤ects on employment or search duration as well as asset accumulation.12
Although increased consumption re‡ects higher income from bad jobs, it is unclear how
individuals alter the allocation of time between work and search.
The individual’s response to changes in the high wage is less revealing. As pay in
good jobs improves, initial as well as terminal consumption both decrease:
@c0=@wH = @¹&=@wH < 0; @cT=@wH < 0
With more attractive good jobs, low wage workers save at a higher rate in order to fa-
cilitate search. Now, however, the phase diagram shifts with wH changes. For a given
the terminal condition, there is higher consumption at each asset level - the consump-
tion paths rotate upward. As such, little can be inferred regarding consumption while
searching. Workers consume less toward the end of search activity (when assets are
low) re‡ecting the greater return to search. Consumption at the outset of search is also
lower although the way in which consumption given relatively high assets responds is
undetermined. Likewise, the steeper path is balanced by a fall in initial and terminal
consumption so working out the duration of search and the initial asset level can not be
done diagrammatically.
12Analytically, these e¤ects depend on the solution of di¤erential equation solution for ct. Given the
structure of this di¤erential equation, the outcome is likely to depend on third derivatives for u(ct):
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4 Empirical Analysis
The model developed in the previous section has many implications, some of which were
drawn out and some of which remain to be fully developed (see the concluding section
for some discussion). The possibilities for empirical work are also numerous. In the
introduction to this paper, data from the a survey of job seekers, the 1995 Canadian
Out-of-Employment Panel Survey, was used to motivate the subsequent development of
the model. In particular, Table 1 documents the prevalence of short term or unsat-
isfactory employment among workers who had previously enjoyed stable employment.
The COEP data is unique among labor market surveys in that in contains measures of
consumption and savings. This paper concludes with an empirical examination of the
model’s predictions regarding consumption and savings. Additional empirical analysis -
including structural estimation of the model - is left for future work.
The model developed in Section 2 makes predictions about consumption and sav-
ings behavior across individuals in di¤erent states: unemployed job search, working in a
temporary job to fund further search, and reemployed in a “good” (high-wage) job. In
particular, the following inequalities are implied:
cT < c0 < wL < wH < cg
where cT is the terminal level of consumption at which search ceases and the level of
consumption during temporary employment; c0 is the initial level of consumption in a
spell of search; cg is the level of consumption in a good job; and wL and wH are the
wages in “bad” and “good” jobs respectively.
Turning to savings, the model predicts saving among those in temporary jobs, dis-
saving among the unemployed, and neither saving nor dis-saving among those in good
jobs. This last prediction of course follows from the fact the model abstracts from life-
cycle savings motives and because the good job is an absorbing state (and hence workers
in the good job have no precautionary motive). Nevertheless, the related predictions
of low consumption and high savings among holders of temporary (low wage) jobs seem
central to the model and provide a sharp contrast with ”permanent income” model, which
predict dissaving among workers temporarily in low wage jobs. Thus these are interesting
features to look for in the data.
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4.1 Data and Sample
The COEP surveys were developed by Human Resources Development Canada in an
attempt to understand the consequences of a series of legislative changes made to the
Canadian UI system. The individuals in the COEP survey are a representative sample of
those who experienced a job separation in particular windows of time. Additional details
can be found in Browning and Crossley (2001a). The analysis in the current paper
focuses on the 1995 survey, in which there were two telephone interviews, conducted in
approximately the 3rd and 5th quarter after job loss. The full 1995 dataset has 3898
respondents in the …rst cohort (separations between January and March 1995) and 3996
respondents in the second cohort (separations between April and June 1995). However,
the COEP sampled all kinds of job separations and the ‡ow out of employment is very
heterogeneous. The analysis in this paper focuses on a restricted sample of workers who
were permanently displaced from a full-time job which they had held for at least one
year.
Initially, the 6% of respondents who reported continuing employment in a second job
across the job loss and the 1.5% of respondents under twenty or over sixty-…ve years
of age were discarded. Next, involuntary separations (laid o¤ or …red/dismissed) were
selected which reduced the sample by a further 32%. A large fraction (62%) of the lay-
o¤s in the COEP data reported that, at the time of the layo¤, they had an expectation of
recall to the …rm that was laying them o¤. Many also reported that they had a speci…c
recall date. In order to focus on ‘permanent’ lay-o¤s, respondents who reported such an
ex ante expectation of recall (with or without a recall date) were dropped.13 The …nal
sample restriction was to select respondents who were displaced from a stable, full-time
employment. About half of the remaining sample had tenure of less than 52 weeks in
the lost job, and these were dropped. So were the approximately 15% of the sample that
had been displaced from a part-time job. This left the sample of 790 “displaced workers”
which forms the basis of the current analysis. About 16% of these withdrew from the
labor force after job loss. Since the model developed above is about search, it o¤ers no
predictions for this group. These are not analyzed in what follows.
13Throughout the paper we use the terms “permanent layo¤” and “displacement” interchangably.
Some of the literature uses a tighter de…nition of “displaced workers,” limiting the term to those laid o¤
as part of a plant closing or other large event.
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4.2 Consumption and Savings after Job Loss
Figure 3 displays distributions of proportional changes in (household) expenditures (con-
sumption) from before the job loss to the …rst interview. Analyzing this transforma-
tion (rather than expenditure levels) removes heterogeneity across households in pre-
displacement expenditure levels. Because we take these workers to have been displaced
from “good” jobs, we are e¤ectively normalizing by the level of expenditures in the good
job (cg).
The sample is split into four groups: those in their …rst spell of unemployment after
a displacement (UE-1), those in a subsequent spell of unemployment (UE-2), and two
groups of employed who consider their job worse (E-1) or at least as good (E-2) as the
previous job. For each group, a “box and whiskers” plot is used to summarize the entire
distribution . The box in each case represents the inter-quartile range (from the 25th
to the 75th percentile) and the “whiskers” above and below the box indicate the 10th
and 90th percentile of the distribution. The median is represented by the horizontal line
across the box (in some cases the median is the same as the 25th or 75th percentile in
which case there is no line). Extreme observations are represented by dots above and
below the box and whiskers (see for example, McGill, Tukey and Larsen, 1978). The
most striking feature of Figure 3 is that the those in jobs that they report are “worse”
than the job they lost exhibit a distribution of proportional expenditure losses which is
distinctly di¤erent from those who rate their jobs the same or better. Moreover, those
in “worse” jobs have proportional changes similar to those who are unemployed. Table
2 reports pairwise t-tests of equality of means and pairwise Kruskal-Wallis (rank) tests
of equality between the distributions presented in Figure 3. These indicate that the
statistical signi…cance of the patterns seen in the …gure. That groups UE-1, UE-2 and
E-1 have the same distribution cannot be rejected at standard signi…cance levels, but
group E-2 has signi…cantly higher values.
As well as consumption we also consider income. Figure 4 suggests that changes the
changes in consumption are not simply a re‡ection of changes in income. While the those
in bad jobs have larger income losses than those in good jobs, they have a smaller median
income loss than the unemployed. Table 3 con…rms (with t-tests and rank tests) that the
distribution of income changes among those in “worse” jobs is statistically di¤erent both
from the distribution of expenditure changes among the other employed groups (in jobs
rated the same or better) and from those in their …rst spell of unemployment.
Figure 5 and Table 4 report on the savings rates of individuals in the four groups
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de…ned above.14 Here we see a striking and statistically signi…cant di¤erence between
those in “worse” jobs and the unemployed: a higher saving rate. In fact, those in “worse”
jobs seem to be saving at the same rate as those in good jobs, despite the fact that the
former are in straightened circumstances - with considerable earnings losses.
5 Conclusions
Examining job search and consumption behavior in an economy with high and low wage
jobs, this paper demonstrates that individuals may work in “bad” jobs to accumulate
assets which subsequently fund search for good jobs. Workers, of course, prefer high wage
employment but to secure one of these good jobs they must …rst engage in uncertain
search. To …nance consumption during this search, job seekers eat into assets - debt
…nancing is not available. To some extent workers without assets can overcome the credit
constraint by accepting low paying jobs. Such employment is readily available but hinders
the ability to search for high pay work. Low wage jobs therefore become temporary
positions that fund subsequent job search. If the ensuing search is unsuccessful, workers
repeat their asset accumulation in low wage employment. As a result, voluntary planned
quits occur in a cyclical pattern that provides an explanation for a series of short job
durations (at low wages) followed by employment at high wages.
Although a fundamental contribution of the paper is to demonstrate a mechanism
for endogenous quits, the cyclical migration between sectors also provides insights into
Harris-Todaro (1970) economies. Workers trade o¤ the bene…ts of immediately available
low wage work against the those of unemployment while looking for good jobs. Here,
however, there are explicit ‡ows between sectors as workers move in and out of low wage
employment. Wages and the costs of moving across sectors determine the size of these
‡ows. Low turnover costs generate rapid movements between high wage job search and
low wage employment.
Job turnover crucially relies on a …nancial market imperfection, the no-debt con-
straint. The credit constraint thus has new implications for the distribution of income.
In the literature, it has been shown that borrowing constraints can a¤ect the distribution
14The expenditure information in the COEP is collected by a series of recall questions. An analysis
of the responses, reported in Browning and Crossley (2002), determined that these questions su¤ered
from an underreporting of expenditures - relative to income - and that this underreporting was largely
independent of the level of expenditure. A corresponding adjustment is made in the calculation of the
savings rates displayed in Figure 3. Note, however, that this proportional adjustment makes no di¤erence
to the pattern of savings rates across the four groups.
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of income by restricting human capital investment choices. Here, capital market imper-
fections have further implications for the distribution of income as they alter job ‡ows.
Without constraints, workers are of course better o¤ ex ante although ex post some will
be unlucky and be resigned to low wage employment with debts.
The turnover generated by the model provides an explanation for the propensity of
recent job losers to take temporary work - as reported by Farber (1997) and demon-
strated here in Canadian data. These episodes of temporary work detract from time
spent searching for a “good” job, and hence provide a partial explanation for the per-
sistence of earnings losses after displacement that have been documented by Jacobson,
Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) and others.
The model has a number of other potentially testable implications. For example, it
suggests a relationship between assets at job loss and the duration of initial search, as
been recently investigated in Stancanelli (1999) and in Bloemen and Stancanelli, (2001).
Given the scope of the current paper, further investigation of these predictions is left for
future work, as is structural estimation of the model.
The empirical section of the current paper instead focuses on a particular strength
of the Canadian data - the collection of consumption data from displaced workers. In
the model, consumption while searching falls over time until either a good job is found
or assets run out and the worker accepts a low wage job. Consumption during employ-
ment at low wages is less than earnings and equal to consumption at the beginning of
job search. Searchers dis-save while temporary workers accumulate assets with which
to resume search. This prediction of high savings and low consumption by workers in
temporary jobs is borne out by the data. Normalized as a fraction of pre-job-loss con-
sumption (to remove heterogeneity), the consumption levels of temporary workers are
starkly di¤erent from those back in “good” jobs and very similar to current searchers.
Their savings behavior is quite di¤erent however, and indeed their savings rates are as
high or higher than those back in “good” jobs (and much higher than the unemployed).
Browning and Crossley (2001b) suggest that it may be di¢cult to detect credit con-
straints and precautionary behavior in nondurable consumption, which households may
do rather a good job of smoothing. Instead they suggest that credit constraints and pre-
cautionary behavior may have a bigger e¤ect on decisions - such as employment, human
capital investment and fertility - which are typically treated as conditioning variables in
consumption studies. This paper provides an example of this idea, with credit constraints
causing employment to be manipulated to smooth consumption during a period of job
search.
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APPENDIX:
Proof of Claims 1-3
Claim 1: For any …xed ¹D where 0 < ¹D < 1; de…ne
V ¹D(A0;T ) = max
&t;ct
¹DZ
0
u(&t)e
¡rtdt+ e¡r
¹D
8<:
TZ
0
u(ct)e
¡(r+®)tdt
+
®
r
TZ
0
u(rAs + wH)e
¡(r+®)sds+ e¡(r+®)Tu(rA0 + wL)=r
9=;
subject to
(i) A0 +
¹DZ
0
(wL ¡ &t)e¡rtdt ¡ e¡r ¹D
TZ
0
cte
¡rtdt ¡ e¡r( ¹D+T )A0 ¸ 0
and
(ii) e¡r(
¹D+T )AT ¸ 0
for K = 0. This is the basic decision problem but with exogenous D; T; AT = A0 and
permanent low wage employment after job search - V (AT ) = u(rA0+wL)=r: As such the
same …rst order conditions (1) and (2) continue to apply along with the budget constraint.
To establish that it is optimal to search when K is small, it is su¢cient to establish
that
¢ ´ V ¹D(A0;T )¡ u(rA0 + wL)=r > 0
for some T > 0: Evaluated at T = 0; V ¹D(A0;T )jT=0 = u(rA0 + wL)=r and hence ¢ = 0:
Moreover, di¤erentiation of V ¹D(A0;T ) and the budget constraint evaluated at the optimal
choices for & t; ct gives
d¢ = e¡rD¡(r+®)T
h
¡u0(cT )(cT ¡ rA0) + u(cT ) + ®
r
u(rA0 + wH)
¡r + ®
r
u(rA0 + wL)
¸
dT
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As T ! 0; cT ! ¹& = rA0 + wL: Therefore
lim
T!0
d¢
dT
= e¡rD
h®
r
(u(rA0 + wH)¡ u(rA0 + wL))¡ u0(rA0 + wL)wL
i
> 0
Therefore, ¢ > 0 for some T > 0 given the assumed condition. QED
Claim 2: Since ct > rAt; if search is …nitely long then lim
t!1
AT = 0. Given At = 0;
consumption equals zero during search: ct = 0: For search not to be too attractive, it
is su¢cient to establish that at some point the worker must strictly prefer low wage
employment over search with zero consumption. If the worker chooses to never move into
low wage employment so that T ! 1; the expected lifetime utility of having zero assets
is given by
®
r
TZ
0
u(wH)e
¡(r+®)tdt =
®
r(r + ®)
u(wH)
A worker with zero assets can always work inde…nitely at a low wage job with payo¤:
u(wL)=r: Given these options, the result follows. QED
Claim 3: To prove this claim, we establish four intermediate results. Recall that the
assumptions in Claims 1 and 2 ensure that 0 < T < 1 and D < 1:
Lemma 4 V 0(A0) = u0(c0)
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Proof: This is a familiar envelope result. Total di¤erentiation of V (A0) gives
V 0(A0)dA0 =
1¡ e¡rD
r
24u0(¹&)¡ ® TZ
0
u0(rAS + wH)e¡®sds
35 d¹&
+e¡rD
TZ
0
8<:u0(ct)e¡®t ¡ ®
TZ
t
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sds
9=; dcte¡rtdt
+e¡rD
8<:u(¹&)¡ r
TZ
0
u(ct)e
¡(r+®)tdt ¡ ®
TZ
0
u(rAs + wH)e
¡(r+®)sds
¡re(r+®)TV (AT ) + ®erD [rA0 + wL ¡ ¹&]
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sds
9=; dD
+e¡rD¡(r+®)T
h
u(cT ) +
®
r
u(rAT + wH)¡ (r + ®)V (AT )
i
dT
+e¡rD¡(r+®)TV 0(AT )dAT + ®
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sdsdA0
Plugging in the …rst order conditions gives
V 0(A0)dA0 = ¹1
8<:1¡ e¡rDr d¹& + e¡rD
TZ
0
dcte
¡rtdt+ e¡r(D+T ) [cT ¡ AT ] dT
¡e¡rD
24wL ¡ ¹& + r TZ
0
cte
¡rtdt+ re¡rTAT + rK
35 dD + e¡r(D+T )dAT
9=;
+¹2e
¡r(D+T )dAT + ®
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sds dA0
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Likewise, di¤erentiation of the budget constraint gives
dA0 =
1¡ e¡rD
r
d¹& + e¡rD
TZ
0
dcte
¡rtdt+ e¡r(D+T ) [cT ¡ AT ] dT
¡e¡rD
24wL ¡ ¹& + r TZ
0
cte
¡rtdt+ re¡rTAT + rK
35 dD + e¡r(D+T )dAT
Combining gives
V 0(A0)dA0 =
8<:¹1 + ®
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)e¡®sds
9=; dA0
+¹2e
¡r(D+T )dAT + e¡rD¡(r+®)TdV (AT )
From the Kuhn Tucker condition in (9), it is straightforward to demonstrate that ¹2e
¡r(D+T )dAT =
0 and hence
V 0(A0) = ¹1 + ®
TZ
0
u0(rAS + wH)e¡®sds = u0(c0)
from equation (1). QED
Lemma 5 If AT > 0; then V 00(AT ) < 0
Proof: AT > 0 implies that ¹2 = 0 and therefore from the …rst order conditions
e¡®TV 0(AT ) = ¹1 = e
¡®Tu0(cT ):
Di¤erentiation gives
V 00(AT ) = u00(cT )
dcT
dAT
:
Likewise di¤erentiation of the …rst order condition
(r + ®)V (AT ) = u(cT ) +
®
r
u(rAT + wH) + u
0(cT )(rAT ¡ cT )
gives
(r + ®)V 0(AT ) = ®u0(rAT + wH) + ru0(cT ) + u00(cT )(rAT ¡ cT ) dcT
dAT
:
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Combining yields the desired result:
V 00(AT ) =
® [u0(cT )¡ u0(rAT + wH)]
rAT ¡ cT < 0:
QED
Lemma 6 If D > 0; then V 00(A0) = 0
Proof: If D > 0; then ¹& is well de…ned and satis…es
rV (A0) = u(¹&) + u
0(¹&)(rA0 + wL ¡ ¹&):
Therefore,
rV 0(A0) = ru0(¹&) + u00(¹&)(rA0 + wL ¡ ¹&) d¹&
dA0
From Lemma 4 and the result that ¹& = c0; it follows that d¹&=dA0 = 0: Further, Lemma
4 yields
V 00(A0) = u00(¹&)
d¹&
dA0
= 0
QED
Lemma 7 Given A0 > 0; AT < A0.
Proof:
Case 1: D = 0: As 0 < T < 1 and ct > rAt; AT < A0 follows immediately.
Case 2: D > 0: Suppose AT ¸ A0: De…ne assets at the end of low wage employment by
AD = e
rDA0 +
erD ¡ 1
r
(wL ¡ ¹&):
Notice that AD > AT by the logic used in Case 1. Individuals with assets A 2 [A0; AD)
choose positive low wage employment, D > 0; and hence from Lemma 6, V 00(A) = 0. As
a result
V 0(A) = V 0( ~A) 8 A; ~A 2 [A0; AD):
Since 0 < T < 1; c0 > ct: Moreover, AT > 0 implies ¹2 = 0 so that V 0(AT ) = u0(cT ):
From Lemma 1, we therefore get the contradiction that
V 0(AT ) = u0(cT ) > u0(c0) = V 0(A0):
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QED
These lemmas are now used to establish the claim. Suppose AT > 0: By Lemma
5, V 00(AT ) < 0: By Lemma 7, AT < A0: From Lemma 6 and Claim 1, V 00(AT ) = 0; a
contradiction. QED
Comparative Static Calculations
For the analysis here let A0 = AT = 0: These asset levels although optimal can be
treated as exogenous in which case equations (7) and (9) become unused. At this point
it is useful to de…ne V; the value of starting (and completing) a cycle of low wage work
followed by search for high wage employment where initial and terminal assets equal zero
(A0 = 0 and AT = 0) :
V =
1¡ e¡rD
r
u(¹&)+ e¡rD
8<:
TZ
0
u(ct)e
¡(r+®)tdt (10)
+
®
r
TZ
0
u(rAs + wH)e
¡(r+®)sds+ e¡(r+®)TV
9=;
where the choice variables, ¹&; ct; T and D equal their optimal values as de…ned by the
…rst order conditions (1), (2), (5), (6) and (8).
Rearranging the equations produces separate equations for ¹& and cT as functions of
V and exogenous parameters
rV ¡ u(¹&)¡ u0(¹&) [wL ¡ ¹&] = 0 (11)
u(cT ) +
®
r
u(wH)¡ (r + ®)V ¡ u0(cT )cT = 0 (12)
As shown in Lemma 4 (as part of the proof to Claim 3),
¹1 + ®
TZ
0
u0(rAS + wH + wF )e¡®sds = u0(¹&)
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Di¤erentiation reveals that after some manipulation:
[1¡ e¡rD¡(r+®)T ]dV = ¡e¡rDu0(¹&) ¢ dK + 1¡ e
¡rD
r
u0(¹&) ¢ dwL
+e¡rD
®
r
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)e¡(r+®)sds ¢ dwH
From (11),
rdV ¡ u00(¹&) [wL ¡ ¹&] ¢ d¹& ¡ u0(¹&) ¢ dwL = 0
Plugging in for rdV gives
d¹& =
1
[1¡ e¡rD¡(r+®)T ]u00(¹&) [wL ¡ ¹&]
©¡re¡rDu0(¹&) ¢ dK
¡e¡rD(1¡ e¡(r+®)T )u0(¹&) ¢ dwL + e¡rD®
TZ
0
u0(rAs + wH)e¡(r+®)sds ¢ dwH
9=;
Likewise, from (12),
®
r
u0(wH) ¢ dwH ¡ (r + ®) ¢ dV ¡ u00(cT )cT ¢ dcT = 0:
Again plugging in for dV gives
dcT =
¡(r + ®)
r[1¡ e¡rD¡(r+®)T ]u00(cT )cT
©
re¡rDu0(¹&) ¢ dK
¡(1¡ e¡rD)u0(¹&) ¢ dwL + ®
·
(1¡ e¡rD)
r + ®
u0(wH)+
+e¡rD
TZ
0
[u0(wH)¡ u0(rAs + wH)] e¡(r+®)sds
35 ¢ dwH
9=;
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: First Interview Employment Status (3rd Quarter after Job Loss)
1. First Spell of Unemployment (UE-1) 33.3%
2. Subsequent Spell of Unemployed (UE-2) 18.2%
3. First Spell of Post-displacement Employment 37.6%
4. Subsequent Spell of Post-displacement Employment 10.9%
Of 3 :
(A) Not Expecting Job to Last 1 Year 11.0% (29:3%)
(B) Expecting Job to Last 1 Year 26.6% (70:8%)
(i) Current Job Worse Than Job Displaced From 9.4% (24:9%)
(ii) The Same or More Satis…ed with Current Job 28.2% (75:1%)
——–
Total Temporary Work: 2.+4.+3.(A) 40.1%
Total Temporary Work: 2.+4.+3.(i) 38.5%
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Table 2: Pair-wise Rank- and t- tests of Common Expenditure Change Distribution
UE-2 E-1 E-2
subsequent spell less satis…ed same or more satis…ed
UE-1
1:94 (0:05)
1:773 (0:183)
0:881 (0:38)
0:889 (0:343)
5:03 (< 0:001)
22:98 (< 0:001)
UE-2 -
0:764 (0:45)
0:058 (0:809)
2:26 (0:025)
7:20 (0:007)
E-1 - -
2:90 (0:004)
5:27 (0:02)
Notes. The boxes give
di¤erence in means: t-stat p-value
KW rank test: Â2 (1) p-value
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Table 3: Pair-wise Rank- and t-tests of Common Income Change Distribution
UE-2 E-1 E-2
subsequent spell less satis…ed same or more satis…ed
UE-1
1:14 (0:26)
2:207 (0:14)
2:77 (0:006)
6:91 (0:009)
9:29 (< 0:001)
79:3 (< 0:001)
UE-2 -
1:45 (0:149)
1:13 (0:287)
6:36 (< 0:001)
32:9 (< 0:001)
E-1 - -
4:25 (< 0:001)
22:94 (< 0:001)
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Table 4: Pair-wise Rank- and t-tests of Common Savings Rate Distribution
UE-2 E-1 E-2
subsequent spell less satis…ed same or more satis…ed
UE-1
0:068 (0:95)
0:040 (0:842)
2:43 (0:016)
7:74 (0:054)
1:31 (0:19)
23:21 (< 0:001)
UE-2 -
2:17 (0:031)
4:990 (0:026)
1:00 (0:32)
12:68 (< 0:001)
E-1 - -
0:46 (0:64)
0:507 (0:476)
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Figure 1: Consumption During Search
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Figure 2: The Cyclical Pattern of Quits
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Figure 3: Proportional Expenditure Changes
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Figure 4: Proportional Income Changes
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Figure 5: Savings Rates
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